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Zusammenfassung 
 
Die Finanzkrise zog seit 2008 schwerwiegende „Krisenmaßnahmen“ nach sich, die auf allen Verwal-
tungsebenen Spaniens darauf konzentriert waren, das Haushaltsdefizit zu verringern. In diesem Kon-
text versuchte die Zentralregierung die Ausgaben regionaler und lokaler Verwaltungen zu beschrän-
ken. Eines der zentralen Instrumente über welche die spanische Regierung verfügte, war die Redukti-
on der öffentlichen Beschäftigung. Der Beitrag untersucht, wie die zwei Lokalverwaltungen von 
Bilbao (Baskenland) und Parla (Madrid) 2010 bis 2015 auf die zentral auferlegten Maßnahmen rea-
gierten, indem ein Varieties of Capitalism-Konzept zur Untersuchung sub-nationaler Institutionen an-
gewandt wird. Es wird der Schluss gezogen, dass Prozesse wirtschaftlicher und sozialer Anpassung in 
Spanien auch durch verschiedene regionale und lokale politische und wirtschaftliche Arrangements 
beeinflusst werden. Es werden Schlüsselfaktoren der unterschiedlichen Folgen für die industriellen 
Beziehungen beschrieben und diskutiert. Die Befunde zeigen, dass verschiedene Typen und Grade der 
Koordination innerhalb einer dezentralisierten Ökonomie existieren können. 
 
Schlagwörter: Spanien, Kommunen, Arbeitsbeziehungen des öffentlichen Sektors, Krisenmanagement 
Local factors shaping public sector industrial relations in a context of crisis: A 
comparison of municipal administrations in Spain  
Abstract  
 
The impact of the 2008 financial crisis led to the imposition of severe ‘crisis measures’ focused on al-
leviating budget deficits at all levels of Spanish government. In this context, the central government 
sought to restrict regional and local government spending. One of the key mechanisms at the Spanish 
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government’s disposal was restricting public sector employment. This paper examines the responses 
to these centrally imposed measures in two local municipal governments, Bilbao (Basque Country) 
and Parla (Madrid) between 2010 and 2015. The paper applies a ‘varieties of capitalism’ conceptual 
approach to investigate what it refers to as subnational institutional systems and suggests that pro-
cesses of economic and social adjustment in Spain are also influenced by distinctive regional and lo-
cal political economic arrangements. Key factors contributing to the different industrial relations out-
comes observed in the two case study locations are described and discussed. The results show that 
different types and degrees of coordination can co-exist within a decentralised national political econ-
omy. 
 
Key words: Spain, municipalities, public sector industrial relations, crisis management (JEL: J45, J5, O52) 
1. Introduction 
The recent economic, financial and sovereign debt crisis affected public sector industrial re-
lations in Europe in quite diverse ways across countries (Bach & Bordogna, 2016). Like-
wise, in Spain, the crisis effects were felt in all parts of the country, but not equally. When 
the crisis struck, one of the most effective levers for a central government interested in lim-
iting lower level government expenditures was a series of quite severe crisis measures di-
rected at public sector employment, which had an asymmetrical impact across levels of 
government, affecting the local level to a greater extent (Molina, 2016).  
Spain has been described as a quasi-federal system of government (Wollmann & 
Iglesias, 2011) composed of a central state, 17 regional governments known as Comuni-
dades Autónomas and 8,685 local entities (mainly city councils) (Goicoechea Bilbao & 
López Herrera, 2014). Both the regional and local levels of government retain significant 
competences for delivering public services, sometimes in conjunction with the state. Mu-
nicipalities administer essential public services – such as water supply, street lighting and 
garbage collection – along with contributions to an assorted list of social services and facili-
ties. In fiscal terms, local municipalities account for around 12 percent of national public 
expenditure and depend upon central state transfer for more than one-third of their income 
(Wollmann & Iglesias, 2011). 
This study focuses on Spanish public sector industrial relations in the period 2010-
2015, with two main objectives. First, we aim to identify the main factors shaping local re-
sponses to crisis measures imposed on municipal public sector by the Spanish central gov-
ernment. Second, we explore institutional political-economy subsystems and their dynamics 
to explain differences in these responses. 
The most direct and significant impact of the 2008 financial crisis in Spain was a dra-
matic economic policy shift, in mid-2010, toward reducing budget deficits at all levels. This 
was the result of the deepening of the recession and pressures from the European Central 
Bank and the international financial markets (Muñoz de Bustillo & Antón, 2013). By the 
end of 2011, the two main Spanish political parties – ‘Partido Popular’ (PP) and ‘Partido 
Socialista Obrero Español’ (PSOE) – had agreed on a constitutional amendment (article 
135) to include debt ceiling provision to “limit the public debt and impose a balanced bud-
get standard for the government as a whole” (Rodriguez-Ferrand, 2011). Severe fiscal aus-
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terity measures were implemented in return for financial assistance for bank recapitaliza-
tion. In 2012, the Spanish banking system ‘rescate’ headed off the potential for multiple 
bank implosions. This occurred at a moment in time when more than €600 billion of Span-
ish debt, which had largely fuelled a construction boom, was being held by banks in Aus-
tria, Belgium, France, Germany, and the Netherlands (Royo, 2013; Hall, 2014). 
One of the key restraints at the disposal of the central government was to place re-
strictions on the public sector workforce through both a freeze in recruitment and a de-
crease in the replacement rate and through extraordinary pay cuts and salary withholdings 
(Montesinos, Pérez & Ramos, 2014; Fernández Leiceaga, Lago Peñas & Vaquero, 2016). 
Changes to the regulatory framework for labour expanded the possibility of using collective 
dismissals in the public sector similar to those available in the private sector, which could 
be justified on the grounds of significant changes in the economic situation. Strong central 
government unilateralism was evident in the implementing of short-term cuts (2010-2012) 
introduced as a response to the crisis (Molina, 2016). 
The effects of the crisis on dependent municipal budgets were quickly felt. From 2010 to 
2011 municipal budgets decreased by 12.1 percent, including reductions of 12 percent in social 
protection, 6.6 percent in health and 14.3 percent in education (Muñoz de Bustillo & Antón, 
2013). At the same time, the crisis brought higher levels of unemployment, an increased need 
for local level social services and protection, which translated into a widening gap between in-
creasing costs and decreasing incomes among municipal governments (Wollmann & Iglesias, 
2011). In 2013, the ‘Rationalization and Sustainability of the Local Administration Act’ was 
introduced. The Act aimed to reduce administration costs, improve the fiscal responsibility of 
each municipality, increase the efficiency of municipal investments, and heighten municipal fi-
nancial control (Ruano & Álvarez, 2016). The reinforcement of control mechanisms and ‘pun-
ishment‘ plans for municipalities not fulfilling deficit requirements (Mellado Ruiz, 2015) im-
posed new levels of central authority over local government finances (Cerdá Aldeguer, 2014) 
pointing toward a recentralization process (Molina, 2016). 
In effect, austerity and control measures fuelled concerns about negative impacts on 
social services for which local municipalities had major or conjoint responsibility (García 
& Fatou, 2015). Public sector trade unions were alarmed by reductions in public employ-
ment at a time of rising demand for public services. Additionally, collective bargaining pro-
cesses and tripartite agreements in the public sector were in practice suspended or side-
lined, public protests and political tensions escalated and, amid a more confrontational en-
vironment, the number of industrial disputes increased (Molina & Miguélez, 2013; Muñoz 
de Bustillo & Antón, 2013). 
It is in this context of crisis that this paper examines the impact of the financial crisis 
on public sector industrial relations at the municipal government level in Spain. Whilst state 
law is binding on all parts of the public administration, and central government measures 
are equally applicable throughout Spain, variation could be observed in municipal level in-
dustrial relations responses to the crisis measures. We compare the responses of two munic-
ipal administrations in the realm of public sector employment, seeking to identify the main 
factors influencing their diverse courses of action and the disparate outcomes achieved. 
In the following, we first present our conceptual framework and analytical proposi-
tions. A methodological section then summarises the design of the comparative case study 
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approach utilised and introduces the two case study municipalities. Section 4 presents our 
main results, with the final section discussing our findings and pointing out the limitations 
of the study. 
2. Conceptual framework and analytical propositions  
2.1  Varieties of capitalism applied to a sub-national institutional system 
The analysis developed in this paper relies on the ‘varieties of capitalism’ (VoC) (Hall & 
Soskice, 2001) approach to national political economy. According to this approach, the 
group of ‘coordinated’ market economies (CMEs) in the ‘north’ or the ‘core’ of Europe, in-
cluding Austria, Belgium, Finland, Germany, and the Netherlands, are national political 
economies characterized by “export-led growth models built on high levels of wage coordi-
nation, sophisticated systems of vocational training, the inter-firm relations necessary to 
operate collaborative research and development, and intra-firm relationships that promote 
continuous innovation and quality control” (Hall, 2014, p. 1226). Another group of ‘mixed’ 
market economies (MMEs), including Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain, are characterized 
by less coordinated wage bargaining processes, less coordinated employer associations 
linked to a deficit in investment in skills training, and firms focused on low-cost competi-
tiveness in domestic consumer sectors (Royo, 2008; Hall, 2014). MMEs’ weak capacity for 
employer-union coordination (Molina & Rhodes, 2007) is partially due to low union densi-
ty rates and to supportive relations between political parties and central organizations lead-
ing to lobbying the state for protection and compensation (Hassel, 2014).  
Spain has been described as a ‘state-influenced market economy’ (Schmidt, 2012) that 
remains corporatist in its response to forces of globalization (Royo, 2007). For example, 
prior to the financial crisis, processes of European Monetary Union and global integration 
have been argued to have prompted increased efforts to coordinate among interested parties 
in Spain, as firms came under pressure to improve competitiveness (Royo, 2007). The in-
terests of employers to create more flexible labour markets whilst keeping wage growth rel-
atively controlled was only achievable with the acquiescence of unions (Royo, 2007). ‘So-
cial pacts’ negotiated between governments, employers and unions, “became an instrument 
not only to achieve wage moderation, but also to negotiate social and labour policies” 
(Royo, 2007, p. 50). Somewhat in contrast to the VoC MME model then, in Spain, the rela-
tive lack of strong coordinating institutions and an economy focused on domestic demand 
has not historically precluded the political negotiation of ‘defensive’ coordination 
measures.  
Spanish political economy is further complicated by the decentralization of power to 
regional Comunidades Autónomas in the transition to democracy from the late 1970s. Insti-
tutional arrangements at the regional level have been found to promote patterns of coordi-
nation that differ from the national level (Royo, 2009). In the Basque Country region, for 
example, relatively cooperative political processes coupled with well-organised civil socie-
ty organisations led to greater levels of coordination and the adoption and institutionalizing 
of a value-adding export-oriented model of economic development in a relatively short 
space of time in the 1990s (Royo, 2009). The process of institutional adjustment and 
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change in Spain may therefore be more strongly influenced by diverse regional dynamics 
and transformations than it is the case in many other European countries. 
From the perspective of VoC, the advent of the financial crisis in Europe triggered a 
range of responses, each of which is best understood “as a product of interactions between 
institutions, interests and ideas” with their national political economy characteristics (Hall, 
2014, p. 1232). However, when the crisis exploded fully, the Spanish government was not 
necessarily able to impose austerity uniformly across the country as all political reforms in 
Spain require cooperation from employer and labour organisations, and extensive coordina-
tion arrangements involving the regions (Schmidt, 2012).  
2.2 Proposed factors shaping local responses 
In the Spanish case then, the ‘interactions of institutions, interests and ideas’ that shaped re-
sponses to the financial crisis also took place at the sub-national level of the political econ-
omy. Based on this premise, our study examines the main factors shaping responses to cri-
sis measures imposed on municipal public sector in Spain in the period 2010-2015. 
The interactions of policies, polities and politics are reflected in the spreading of ideas 
and discourses. Considering the decentralised model of governance in Spain and the appar-
ent absence of a persuasive post-crisis discourse from the state toward the regions 
(Schmidt, 2012), the first expectation of our study was that the existence of a culture of re-
gional/local autonomy would shape the response to the centrally-imposed crisis measures 
on local public sector. 
From a VoC approach, the state has a central role in solving coordination problems be-
tween business and labour organisations in MMEs. The state matters “as a state of mind as 
much as the state in action” (Schmidt, 2012, p. 182). The ‘historical patterns’ (Hall, 2014) 
and ‘ideational imprints from the past’ (Schmidt, 2012) which shape the political econo-
mies of MMEs, we also expect to exist at sub-national levels in the case of Spain. With 
these factors in mind, our second expectation was that the regional/local historical trajecto-
ry and a policy legacy of collaborative community-based governance will be decisive in 
shaping responses to centrally-imposed restrictions on the local public sector. 
The organisational characteristics of interested parties are also regarded as an important 
variable shaping MME characteristics (Molina & Rhodes, 2007), as is the quality of politi-
cal leadership and the probity and competence of state officials as agents of change 
(Schmidt, 2012). These elements give rise to our third expectation that a culture of region-
al/local autonomy (P1) combined with a historically collaborative community-based gov-
ernance (P2) will align local actors’ goals (P3) in response to centrally-imposed measures 
impacting local public sector, creating a reinforcing effect (Figure 1). 
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Figure 1 Analytical propositions on determinants of local responses 
3. Research approach and case studies 
The case study reported on this paper followed a comparative design, with explanations fo-
cused on the factors that contributed to differences between our two cases. The empirical 
analyses are based on primary data collected through a series of matched interviews in two 
local municipalities in Spain. In both municipalities interviews were conducted with repre-
sentatives of the human resource department, the finance department and the two main 
trade unions, in January 2015. Interviews were conducted in Spanish, then transcribed and 
coded to explore responses related to our analytical propositions (Figure 1). The selected 
quotes used in this paper were translated into English by the authors. In addition, a range of 
relevant secondary data was compiled to characterise the cases, to document changes in 
regulations, and to triangulate impacts and changes reported by interviewees as much as 
possible. 
The rationale for the selection of the cases followed three criteria. First, we considered 
mid-size cities with a total population between 100,000 and 350,000. According to the Na-
tional Statistical Institute, there are 54 cities in this range in Spain. Second, we looked for 
cities with very different levels of financial indebtedness when the crisis struck, in order to 
test our propositions in contrasting conditions (Yin, 2003). Finally, we selected our local 
government cases in two regions with different systems of regional financing, again to 
drive contrast in our cases (Yin, 2003). The cases were thus selected on the basis of expec-
tations regarding their information content and a strategy of seeking maximum variation 
(Flyvbjerg, 2001) in terms of their financial indebtedness and fiscal autonomy among mid-
sized cities in Spain.  
The two municipalities chosen for the comparative case study were Bilbao in the north-
ern Basque Country region and Parla in the central Madrid region (Table 1). 
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Table 1  Characteristics of the Bilbao and Parla municipalities 
 
1 Instituto Nacional de Estadística (2016); 2 Cinco Días (2014); 3 Fernández Leiceaga et al. (2016, p. 29). 
 
Case 1: Bilbao 
Bilbao is a prominent Basque city, which in the 1980’s initiated a comprehensive restruc-
turing of the existing industrial fabric (mainly metallurgy), which became a deep and long-
term modernisation process. As a result, the city began to promote a new economy focused 
on tourism and services, including creative and cultural industries. The City Council pro-
moted a strategic plan for the revitalization of abandoned industrial sites and deteriorated 
zones. A key milestone in this urban transformation was the Guggenheim Museum, which 
signified a radical change in the city’s self-image. Likewise, especially from the second half 
of the 1990’s, the policy of the Basque government promoted advanced manufacturing, 
technological centres and new industry clusters, including energy, paper-making, electron-
ics, information and communication technology, maritime industries and aeronautics 
(Elola, Valdaliso, López & Aranguren, 2012). This strategy was based on the Basque gov-
 
 Bilbao Parla 
Province, Region, 
(Location) Bizkaia, Basque Country (North) Madrid, Madrid (Centre) 
Population 20151 345,141 125,056 
Debt per person 2013 
(€)2 20.9 2,940.7 
Regional spending 
powers3 
Extensive + police + local level + 
language 
Extensive + provincial level 
(regional sub-divisions) 
Govt. 
political 
party 
Pre 2015 
election EAJ-PNV 
(Basque Nationalist Party) 
PSOE 
(Spanish Socialist Party) 
Post 2015 
election 
PP 
(Popular Party) 
Main public services 
provided 
Social services, local police & internal administration. 
Limited competences for education: maintenance of public primary 
and secondary school buildings 
Health: inspection of the health standards of local businesses 
Dependent 
enterprises or 
organisations 
11 with around 450 employees in 
2014. Mainly related to cultural 
activities, informatics, 
transportation or housing. Each 
has its own HR management & 
collective bargaining, but town 
hall conditions are also applied 
----- 
Municipal public 
sector workforce 
Around 2200 in 2014,  
800 of which were police Around 630 in 2014. 
Employment tenure 
100% civil servants at town hall. 
Mainly salaried in municipal 
enterprises 
36% civil servants & 64% 
salaried 
From total civil servants, 70% are 
police 
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ernment’s decision to jointly work with the principal economic and institutional stakehold-
ers to improve regional competitiveness (Royo, 2009). Public administrations in the region, 
including at the local level, participated in policy formation and contributed positively to 
the transformation (Royo, 2009). The city was governed by the regional nationalist party 
EAJ-PNV throughout this time, including the financial crisis and the period of this case 
study. 
The Basque region is culturally distinctive with its own lexically isolated language, 
Euskera. Under the special foral community model in the Basque Country (and neighbour-
ing Navarre), the regional treasury controls ‘tax figures representing 95 percent of their to-
tal revenue’ (Fernández Leiceaga et al., 2016, p. 4). This full tax autonomy in terms of reg-
ulatory capacity, management capacity and collection, leads to substantially higher per cap-
ita revenues compared to other regions (Fernández Leiceaga et al., 2016). In the midst of 
the financial crisis, the municipality of Bilbao had the second lowest amount of local gov-
ernment debt amongst all Spanish municipalities with a population of more than 75,000 
(Goicoechea Bilbao & López Herrera, 2014).  
Public sector employment in Bilbao was relatively stable in the period leading up to the 
onset of the crisis. The ratio of fixed-term salaried workers and temporary civil servants (in-
terinos) within the local public sector workforce was reported to be relatively low (around 
18%). Although there were no dismissals, the workforce declined by around 160 persons 
during the crisis, through retirements and other attrition. This impact was moderated to 
some extent through municipal and community mechanisms. Some replacements continued 
to be made in essential services such as firefighters and police and required salary cuts were 
softened by using a sliding scale depending on pay levels (the average reduction was 
around 2.8%). The elimination of the Christmas bonus in 2012 was counteracted by the 
municipal authorities, who brought forward the 2013 bonus in the form of a zero percent 
personal loan. 
Case 2: Parla 
Parla is a satellite city of Madrid, the national capital and largest urban agglomeration. The 
predominant activity in Parla’s economy is commerce (77%). The other two main sectors 
are hotel-related business and the provision of general services (Ayuntamiento de Parla, 
2014). There is relatively little industrial activity in the area and a low level of investment 
by large companies. In line with a common trend propelling the Spanish economy from the 
mid-1990’s until 2008, Parla also experienced a real estate boom. From 2000, the city un-
derwent rapid population growth due to strong urban investment and rapid infrastructure 
development, including construction of 13,800 residences in East Parla and a continuing 
wave of immigration to Spain. This meant an increase in hiring temporary workers at the 
town hall to cover a higher demand for public services. When the crisis struck, Parla was 
governed by the centre-left social party (PSOE), but a minority conservative Popular Party 
(PP) government took power following the local (and regional) elections held in 2015. 
The Madrid region, like all (non-foral) common system regions, has reduced collection 
and management capacity over some forms of taxation including income tax and consump-
tion tax (VAT). At the start of the crisis the central government had divested itself of its fis-
cal transfer capacity (Fernández Leiceaga et al., 2016, p. 6), but without imposing signifi-
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cant budgetary constraints at the lower levels (León, 2009). In Parla, the financing required 
to cover the increased demand for services had grown rapidly, so when conditions suddenly 
changed the local government found itself running one of the worst debt-to-revenue ratios 
of all city councils in the country – 519.4 percent in 2013 (Goicoechea Bilbao & López 
Herrera, 2014). To reduce the level of local government debt, the central government ap-
proved various extraordinary mechanisms from 2012, which “entailed a substantial increase 
in local and regional government debt vis-à-vis the state. The funding mechanisms agreed 
on require compliance with certain adjustment plans” (Téllez, Hernández de Cos, Hurtado 
& Pérez 2015, p. 6). In the specific case of Parla, the City Council participated in three cen-
tral mechanisms to finance payments due to suppliers. In exchange, local managers had to 
report to the central government on a quarterly basis. The Parla municipality’s failure to 
fully satisfy fiscal duties to state institutions (tax agency, social security agency) also meant 
that 100 percent of certain periodic funds, dedicated for large municipalities, were withheld.  
Public sector employment in Parla grew from around the year 2000, driven by an in-
crease in salaried and temporary workers to meet the demands for new local services. 
Fixed-term positions rose to make up a relatively substantial proportion of the total local 
government workforce (around 40%). When the crisis struck, central administration control 
measures took effect rapidly in Parla. A decrease in salary of 5 percent was imposed in late 
2010, along with an increase in working hours. The Christmas bonus was also eliminated, 
while days off were reduced, and a “zero replacements for retirees approach” was taken. In 
addition, a total of 66 non-permanent employees were made redundant in 2011, (although 
the vast majority appealed to the Courts and some succeeded in being reinstated). 
4. Results 
4.1 Decentralisation and the culture of autonomy 
Decentralisation has been possibly one of the main forces in Spanish political economy in 
recent decades. From the mid-1980s until the early 1990s this process focused on the de-
velopment of the Comunidades Autónomas and the regulation of local municipalities. Since 
then, and up to the recent crisis, there have been important changes to regulations which 
further emphasize a decentralisation approach (Bassols Coma, 2014). First, in 1999 a new 
law reinforced competences at the local level and coordination instruments with the Co-
munidades Autónomas. Second, a new Act in 2003 focused on a modernisation process and 
management improvements, especially for big cities. A further proposed reform (Anteproy-
ecto de Ley Básica del Gobierno y la Administración Local) in 2007 was interrupted by the 
financial crisis and remains unfulfilled. Regional government budgets, which in Spain had 
become increasingly independent from the national government through decentralisation, 
were suddenly under pressure from all sides – the EU, the financial markets and the central 
government. 
All municipalities in Spain share elements of a basic common institutional framework. 
First, internal economic and financial control is exercised for the city council by the eco-
nomic chief (Interventor), part of a special group of central state civil servant technicians. 
Second, the central government delegation in the regions (Delegado del Gobierno) carries 
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out some monitoring and coordination tasks. Third, regional audit councils (Tribunal de 
Cuentas) can perform ex-post controls on budgetary execution to seek fiscal consolidation. 
Likewise, there is some general legal binding from higher institutional levels, for example, 
the central state budgetary law. From September 2011 the amendment of article 135 of the 
Spanish Constitution for the enforcement of the principle of budgetary stability additionally 
bound all public administrations at all government levels. Within this framework, local 
governments have varying degrees of budgetary authority over their own expected revenues 
and spending, which is finally approved in a plenary session. The central state and the re-
gional government also transfer some specific subsidies to contribute to the cost of some 
public services provided by the municipalities. 
A heightened sense of cultural and historically grounded autonomy can be said to exist 
in the Basque Country. The foral model means that the Provincial Council (Diputación 
Provincial) collects, manages and distributes tax money among the city councils in the re-
gion. In exceptional cases of unsustainable finances, the Provincial Council also supervises 
the budget. Interactions between these different levels of government within the region are 
preliminary built on professional and technical relations.  
Employers and trade unions in the Bilbao municipality share a commitment to regional 
autonomy, especially in response to any perceived national attempts to recentralise opera-
tions. 
“We support the sphere of Basque decision-making and our employers, who are politicians, also do… There 
is the central state’s interest in recentralisation but it will be more difficult to be implemented in the Basque 
country.” (B3-trade union) 
As they enjoy a relatively good financial situation, the Basque Country government public-
ly supported maintaining public services in the region during the crisis.  
“The social agents can negotiate in the Basque country to set the scope of the public sector and the public 
services.” (B4-trade union) 
In line with this sense of cultural autonomy, the pro-independence union favours a more re-
gionalist conception of the public sector. 
As Parla was considered to be at financial risk, the municipal budget was under excep-
tional ex ante revision by the Spanish Ministry of Finance, in addition to the regular institu-
tional mechanisms described above. The Ministry checked that budgetary figures were in 
accordance with the state fiscal adjustment plan. Some local actors considered that part of 
the current financial problems could be solved if the state actually took more direct deci-
sions on local economic issues.  
“A public employee could get better labour and union guarantees at a higher government level since at the 
local level we are going through a tougher crisis than at regional or central levels.” (P4-trade union)  
Evidence of tensions between decentralisation and recentralisation were thus seen in both 
cases, although these tensions were very differently configured. In Parla, sentiment favour-
ing some recentralisation was likely to be based on a growing distrust of local politicians, 
mainly due to prominent corruption cases and the level of indebtedness incurred. The situa-
tion generated complaints regarding an apparent lack of effective supervision and control 
over spending in the past. As a reaction to dismissals and the worsening of the working 
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conditions of public employees in the municipality, higher levels of government seemed to 
be considered a relatively ‘safe haven’ by some. 
Our first proposition, that the existence of a culture of autonomy would determine to 
some extent the nature of the response to the centrally-imposed crisis measures, is support-
ed by the empirical evidence. In the case of Bilbao, the culture of autonomy is strongly em-
bedded in the municipality and inspired local actors to firmly oppose the central state’s im-
positions. This opposition can be understood as an expression of a deep-seated resistance to 
recentralisation attempts in general. In the case of Parla, a much weaker culture of autono-
my exists. Centralised decisions were here perceived as a potential problem solution, in a 
context where a demand for protection and compensation from the state, characteristic of 
MMEs, is quite prevalent (Schmidt, 2012; Hall, 2014). 
4.2 Collaborative community-based governance 
The tradition of trade union participation in the organisation of work is strong in Bilbao. 
The main unions at the regional and local levels are Basque Workers Solidarity (Eusko 
Langileen Alkartasuna, ELA), which is the oldest and strongest regionalist and Basque na-
tionalist trade union, and the Nationalist Workers’ Committee (Langile Abertzaleen 
Batzordeak, LAB), the trade union wing of the Basque independence movement1. Each of 
the two accounts for more than 15 percent of the workers’ delegates in the region. They are 
in relatively strong positions when participating in regional collective bargaining processes 
and have the right to representation in regional public institutions.  
In terms of decision-making procedures, the development of Bilbao’s public sector 
seemingly relies on the strengthening of budget practices which are built on the basis of a 
realistic prevision of revenues and internal collaborative methods. 
“Most public administrations used to include in their budgets artificially high expected revenues. That has 
terrible cumulative consequences if you keep equivalent levels of spending (…) There is not just a mere in-
ternal fiscal ex post control but a previous internal advisory work to fulfil the requirements and then, over 
that, we establish certain procedural routines to follow (…) Some projects stem from citizens’ participation in 
their local districts and then are included in the municipal budget.” (B1-finance department)  
In Bilbao, trade unions and the local government have maintained fluent interactions, which 
have helped with internal decision-making and the exploration of ways to side-line the aus-
terity measures imposed by the central government. 
“Facing the recent general trend to harmonise worse labour conditions for the public employees in Spain, we 
endeavoured to explore all means of non-application here.” (B3-trade union) 
Retrenchments that were seen as imposed by the EU for deficit reasons were not considered 
to fit with the local economic situation in Bilbao. Their compulsory implementation led to 
                                                                          
1 “ELA was founded (…) in the context of social Catholic Basque nationalism and was long close to the 
Basque nationalist party, the PNV (…) It is characterised by an efficient organisation and negotiating capa-
bility. Since the 1990s it has been aligned with the radical separatist LAB and has distanced itself from the 
CCOO and the UGT. It has around 100,000 members (…) With a strong grassroots orientation LAB devel-
oped into an effective trade union organisation which (…) participates actively in collective bargaining and 
interest representation activities” (Köhler & Calleja Jiménez, 2013, p. 2). 
354 Irene Ramos-Vielba, Richard Wolley 
some improvisation and informal procedures became the unintended consequences of the 
imposition of the crisis measures. 
Active interaction and information exchange practices have been fostered on the basis 
of promoting good general relations between employers and employees. 
“Beyond a certain level of disagreement, which does exist, we keep ‘peace’, because they also give in.” (B3-
trade union) 
“In general terms, the city council is not a very conflictual environment of public industrial relations.” (B4-
trade union) 
Seeking consensus and collaboration is said to come first in the local public sector industri-
al realm. This is not to deny that more confrontational steps may sometimes be taken, al-
though the record of successful past agreements is seen to have discouraged further mobili-
sation at times. 
“Sometimes there are disputes affecting specific groups of public employees (e.g. local police) and we had to 
use strong protest actions, a carrot and stick approach (…) In the Bilbao city council, as we get some 
achievements, in the end, it is more difficult to mobilise people.” (B3-trade union) 
In fact, there were no local level strikes directly related to the central labour force austerity 
measures imposed in 2010 and 2012. However, there were a high number of union actions 
and several general strikes in the region because of austerity measures and the resulting 
worsening conditions of all workers in Spain. These circumstances contributed to strength-
ening the trade unions’ positions to some extent. 
In Parla, the union map has followed the national pattern more closely. The two largest 
unions, the socialist General Workers’ Confederation (UGT) and the post-communist Con-
federation of Workers’ Commissions (CCOO), have traditionally accounted for the majori-
ty of the representatives in the elections for workers’ delegates and work councils at the lo-
cal level. Since its founding, UGT has kept strong linkages with the Socialist party (PSOE). 
This includes the municipal government level, which may have conditioned some courses 
of action and eventually generated some disaffection among public employees who felt that 
the union was too close to the governing socialist politicians. The large traditional unions 
have come to be considered “part of the political system and its institutions and are thus 
criticised by many civil society protest movements” (Köhler & Calleja Jiménez, 2013, p. 1). 
The recent crisis has intensified citizens’ demands for public accountability and the social 
perception of the big trade unions has progressively deteriorated. 
“Workers have been devastated by the crisis. They have seen the majoritarian trade unions’ as accomplices in 
corruption behaviour. That is why minority radical unions are gaining more support.” (P4-trade union) 
In spite of the difficult times brought about by the crisis, and the subsequent high levels of 
discussion and disagreement at the workplace, intermittent negotiations continued in Parla. 
But interpersonal and informal interactions were progressively substituted by more formal 
instruments.  
“Being a medium-size city, the traditional functioning was more face-to-face and informal oriented. In the 
last years, however, every decision that is approved is provided in a written document.” (P2-human resource 
department) 
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The decision process for the implementation of cost-cutting in Parla was characterised as 
turbulent.  
“Random and political criteria were incorporated to apply employees’ redundancies rather than a more planned 
and rational approach. It also counted on some other actors’ consent or connivance.” (P4-trade union) 
In the opinion of some unionists, the cost-cutting process was not transparent enough and 
the seeds of mistrust between involved were sown. 
Finally, the weaknesses of the local financing system and a broad discretion for elec-
torally-driven economic decisions by local politicians, combined with insufficient external 
financial controls at the regional level, generated a perfect storm effect where all circum-
stances together aggravated the resulting situation. This led to speculation about the need 
for institutional reforms, amid the inherent conflicts and heightened potential for corruption 
that exists where local powers are too closely fused. 
“Political and executive spheres could be separated by appointing a manager responsible for the provision of 
quality and cost-effective public services.” (P1-finance department) 
As a consequence, the role of the implanted state financial controller, the Interventor, had 
to be reinforced with regard to local decision-making procedures.  
A conflictual environment emerged in Parla in the aftermath of the crisis. Some disput-
ed cases were taken to the Courts to be resolved, with a range of different judicial out-
comes. Whilst there were some demonstrations and protest actions to oppose personnel 
dismissals, there was no strike. Unions refused to negotiate the redundancies and other ar-
rangements weakening working conditions. These were then unilaterally applied, showing 
the futility of such refusals to negotiate.  
“As unions, we are in favour of agreements to effectively facilitate savings and good services (…) Our line of 
work is not breaking bridges. We represent public workers and we care for them in the first place, but we will 
not be waiting for a few crumbs as others did in the past… We fight for labour rights, not for some privileg-
es, so we are open to dialogue but also to mobilisation.” (P4-trade union) 
In spite of significant expressions of dissatisfaction, a relatively acquiescent attitude re-
mained. The unions did not adopt a disruptive strategy since there was a basic understand-
ing of the critical nature of the situation, and a sense of the limitations that applied in such 
exceptional circumstances. 
The evidence gathered quite strongly supports our second proposition, that the histori-
cal trajectory and policy legacy of collaborative community-based governance would be 
decisive in shaping the response to centrally-imposed crisis measures. Bilbao’s greater lev-
els of coordination allowed the actors there to face adversity and resist to some extent. In 
comparison, the relatively low degree of institutional coordination among actors in the Par-
la case, coupled with perceived personal conflicts of interest, actually fostered the gate-
keeping role of the central state. 
4.3 Aligning local actors’ goals 
In the immediate aftermath of the crisis, collective employment bargaining processes were 
largely suspended or side-lined in the public sector at the various levels (central, regional 
and local) in Spain (ILO, 2014). However, in several regions of Spain regionalist-nationalist 
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trade unions exert strong influence, as is the case in the Basque Country (Köhler & Calleja 
Jiménez, 2013). A distinctive feature, especially of ELA, is a very high union density and 
strong grass-roots support in the workplace. In terms of bargaining, this obviously entails a 
stronger negotiating position for improving working conditions.  
“Our model in the Basque country is founded in a differentiated dynamic of confronting about contents. Both 
the financial autonomy of our unions and the fact that our strength stems from membership put us in a better 
position to negotiate. As a consequence, the working conditions of the public employees in the Basque coun-
try have been usually better than in the rest of the state.” (B3-trade union) 
Likewise, trade unions’ participation in dense regional networks and broader social allianc-
es provide stronger support for being more aggressive in their demands and jointly organis-
ing some complementary union and social actions.  
Employer organisations, in both the public and the private sectors, also hold strong po-
sitions and play powerful roles in the configuration of regional industrial relations. The 
maintenance of a relatively equal balance of forces at the regional and local levels seems to 
have encouraged lively bargaining processes. Before the crisis, periodic bargaining rounds 
facilitated the relatively straightforward setting of labour arrangements in the municipality 
of Bilbao. After the crisis, bargaining difficulties arose due to the cutbacks imposed by the 
central state and implemented by the local government. As a way to circumvent those re-
strictions, the municipality started to make some exceptional agreements, which were 
sometimes presented as being somewhat unilateral. In reality, these agreements were based 
on prior negotiations with the trade unions to jointly find creative formulas to resist – to 
some extent – the austerity measures centrally imposed. The LAB union, however, still 
maintained their demands for the creation of new employment, further transformations or 
new measures to effectively counteract the restrictions imposed on public sector employ-
ment. 
In Bilbao, the confluence of some elements – ranging from well-established regional 
nationalist political parties to a charismatic Mayor who held power for 16 years (deceased 
in 2014) – appeared to create a quite stable and primarily pragmatic atmosphere. Continued 
strong electoral support for the Basque Nationalist Party EAJ-PNV ‒ which has governed in 
the city since the first democratic local elections in 1979, either alone or in coalition with 
others ‒_ was ratified in the most recent local elections in May 2015.  
The pre-existing closeness between the main trade union ELA and EAJ-PNV was not 
seen as preventing them from independent action and negotiating positions. 
“No matter the accumulated years in power, EAJ-PNV has had the wisdom to realise that they should keep a 
receptive attitude to confront different positions.” (B3-trade union) 
Basque nationalist political parties in the regional and local governments inevitably had the 
disposition to oppose retrenchments imposed by the central government. 
“In those regional institutions and municipalities where nationalist parties (EAJ-PNV and EH BILBU) were 
in power, the application of the central state reforms was minimized. But in those places within the Basque 
country where PP [Partido Popular, also the national governing party after November 2011] was governing, 
the reforms were applied although not in so strict a way as in the rest of the country.” (B3-trade union) 
In contrast, the LAB’s project is linked to a radical-left policy and separatist movement 
views.  
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“Our demanding attitude intended to point out weaknesses in the municipal policy but we did not have ex-
pectations of approval due to the political majority in the city council.” (B4-trade union) 
This political alignment was also viewed as a reason why they have been seen to be more 
aggressive in their demands. 
In Parla, union density in the public sector is not high except for the local police force. 
There had been no new collective agreements for some years. Parts of a former agreement 
became inapplicable after the central state implemented changes to working conditions. 
Other parts were declared invalid by the state authorities (Delegado del Gobierno) and the 
abolition of the automatic extension of collective agreements (July 2013) intensified this 
unsatisfactory situation. In 2014, on-going negotiations were conducted with a positive po-
litical will, but the employer side found it difficult to fulfil some demands. From the trade 
unions’ view, there was a very good previous collective agreement, so to negotiate to wors-
en their conditions was difficult to accept.  
“They are not demanding better conditions anymore. They are just seeking to keep their labour rights they al-
ready had before the crisis, and which have been eliminated in the public sector.” (P4-trade union) 
Further dismissals continued to breed fear and further weakened public employees’ de-
mands and expectations.  
Another consequence of the crisis also appears to have been a weakening of trade un-
ions’ power (Miguélez et al., 2015) and the emergence of some individualization in the ne-
gotiation of labour conditions. 
“Trade unions have lost their mobilization capacity when strikes have turned ineffectively into some particu-
lar non-beneficial agreements (…) Neglecting negotiation has pushed employers to act in small groups or 
even to negotiate individually.” (P4-trade union)  
In spite of some local social alliances that mobilized street protests, local trade unions had a 
limited disruptive capacity in practice.  
“There were protest actions and demonstrations but trade unions have seen that these [labour] conditions, 
which are not negotiated, are no-matter-what applied, and subsequently have changed their attitude.” (P2-
human resource department) 
In the end, the unions in Parla were led to adopt a more pragmatic approach. 
The Parla political climate had been characterised by close links between the main 
trade union UGT and, up to 2015, the predominant governing political party at the local 
level (the Spanish Socialist Party, PSOE). Tight interconnections and mutual dependence 
could have been fruitful in the past to some extent, but they became counterproductive 
when the crisis struck and a patronage system was exposed. This outcome was intensified 
significantly by the negative impact of some high-profile corruption cases (e.g. Punica 
case) involving Parla and the ensuing saturation media coverage. 
“Our area has undergone string pulling practices which have hindered a stronger union opposition to the cut-
backs.” (P4-trade union) 
Local elections in May 2015 changed the political balance, with a minority conservative 
government (seven from 27 seats) and a left political representation (20 seats) fragmented 
among four parties.  
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“More political fragmentation could make it more difficult to get agreements. The final economic and finan-
cial decisions on budget issues and adjustment plans are taken in plenary sessions. If that does not happen, 
the administration collapses.” (P1-financial department) 
Expectations of confrontations between the opposed political groupings at the local political 
level were viewed as likely to provide a further source of frustration in trying to develop a 
strategy to assist Parla to emerge from the on-going crisis conditions.  
Our third proposition, that a culture of local autonomy combined with collaborative 
community-based governance will tend to align actors’ goals, is also supported by the evi-
dence of our Bilbao case. Clear differences can be seen in terms of union strength and the 
existing bargaining conditions in the two locations. In Bilbao, historical relationships of co-
operation between political parties and regional nationalist unions are linked to mutual in-
vestment in a clearly defined regional project of economic and social renewal. These ele-
ments helped generate a reinforcing effect regarding local actors’ response of measured re-
sistance to centrally imposed crisis measures that restricted public sector employment. In 
Parla, public sector union density was relatively low, whilst historical relationships between 
the main trade union present and one of the two major national political parties were cloud-
ed in corruption. As a result, the local response to the central government imposition of cri-
sis measures impacting public sector employment was relatively ineffectual.  
5. Discussion and conclusions 
A highly decentralised government system and the particularly strong impact of the recent 
economic and financial crisis make Spain a good context in which to observe contrasting ef-
fects of ‘crisis measures’ on public sector industrial relations. In this paper, we sought to ex-
plain different courses of action and outcomes in response to these centrally imposed 
measures through a comparative case study of two municipal administrations. Analysis of the 
diverse perceptions and reactions of representatives of both employers and employees at the 
two city councils allowed us to illustrate three main factors influencing the actual implemen-
tation of centrally imposed measures on local public sector. Local economic and socio-
political developments in the context of crisis do seem to be nationally and supra-nationally 
determined to a very significant extent. But as we were able to show, actual outcomes are also 
the result of some improvised responses based on particular combinations of institutions, in-
terests and ideas and how these configure differing degrees of coordination among relevant 
local actors. Interestingly, the interplay of these institutions, interests and ideas occurred at, 
and between, national and at sub-system levels (regional and local), presenting some chal-
lenges to the varieties of capitalism framework in which our analysis is situated. 
Historical trajectories and policy legacies shape and constrain the varieties of political 
economy we observed (Schmidt, 2012), as well as the diverging perceptions of the crisis 
measures. In the Bilbao case, the measures were widely interpreted as taking advantage of 
the crisis context to further a recentralisation agenda. In Parla, the measures were viewed as 
more straightforwardly fiscal matters. In Bilbao, the existence of a stronger culture of au-
tonomy provided the basis for actors’ convergence around the interpretation of the 
measures through the broader political recentralisation theme. The existence of a predomi-
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nant consensus-oriented environment led trade unions and city council representatives to 
actively negotiate formulas to pragmatically resist both public sector retrenchments and 
these recentralisation attempts. In contrast, in Parla, a much weaker culture of autonomy 
and a more conflictive post-crisis public sector industrial relations scenario can be linked to 
the emergence of a degree of acquiescence to the potential recentralisation of financial con-
trols, as a drastic, yet pragmatic means to overcome a highly precarious situation. 
Our analysis reveals distinctive modes of public sector governance. The specific histor-
ical trajectory in each municipality and the degree of institutional coordination that has 
been developed in the contexts of their respective socio-economic transitions, appear essen-
tial in shaping these crisis responses. In the first case study, a progressive transformation 
over several decades, from old industries to a services-innovation economy, entailed some 
difficult but necessary economic and social adjustments. The adoption of a series of strate-
gic industry, science and technology plans and the promotion of priority industry clusters 
was done using a process of bottom up stakeholder consultation and a focus on building a 
cooperative culture, both among firms within (and between) clusters, and among all institu-
tional actors in the region (Royo, 2009). Such a process of metamorphosis also contributed 
to nourishing local networks and building local realignment capacities more along the mod-
el of community development. To a significant extent, aspects of the socio-economic model 
embraced in the Basque Country – high skills, valued added exports – more closely parallel 
the CME ideal-type than it does the MME typically associated with Spain. In contrast, the 
economic evolution in Parla could be seen as a classic example of market-driven solutions 
implemented amid rapid urban investment and expansion. This intense economic conver-
sion produced a dramatic surge in demand for public services to match the rapid expansion 
of infrastructure and population. Following a similar logic, the type of public employment 
created to respond to this dramatic increase in urban demands was mainly temporary, in 
some cases linked to the delivery of services by private or quasi-private providers. These 
employees were then more easily made redundant when the crisis hit. Different underlying 
histories and approaches to economic development therefore also seem to partially explain 
subsequent ‘crisis response’ outcomes in the local public sector industrial relations realm.  
Our comparative results show the importance of alignment among relevant actors in 
configuring both processes and outcomes in local public sector industrial relations. Both 
case studies are characterised by a historical single party monopoly over municipal political 
power. However, the consolidation of more integrated and collaborative bargaining practic-
es in one context strengthened union power, whilst putting all local partners onto a relative-
ly sound footing to face (and resist) an adverse situation. In contrast, the perpetuation of a 
localised culture of unchallenged political hegemony and patronage schemes, subsequently 
linked to cases of corruption, appears to be associated with both an exaggerated financial 
disaster and a weakened capacity of local institutions to respond to the crisis situation. 
The varieties of capitalism literature places great emphasis on the degree of coordina-
tion existing between actors and institutions in shaping modes of political economy. 
Through our two empirical case studies, we observed the existence of markedly different 
degrees of coordination: on the one hand more akin to the CME model (Bilbao) and on the 
other hand more typical of a MME (Parla). Coordination has not been as historically absent 
in Spain as the MME ideal-type model might imply, rather ‘social pacts’ have played an 
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important role in economic adjustment, particularly in the demands for enhanced competi-
tiveness in the face of the global integration of markets (Royo, 2007). Such forms of coor-
dination between government, employers and unions have likely been important in resisting 
pressures to adopt a more liberal (Anglo-American) market model, while also externalizing 
the costs of adjustment by passing them on to workers through artificial wage moderation 
(Molina & Rhodes, 2007). However, at the same time, our case study supports the findings 
of other research in the Basque Country (Royo, 2009), that suggests that variation in modes 
of political economy may also be evident at sub-national system levels.  
The role of regional government in a strategy that depends, to a significant degree, on 
collective investment in public goods (such as higher skills through apprenticeship training) 
can foster differentiation in the political economy at this sub-national level. Such a strategy 
is characteristic of the Basque Country and to some degree the collective organisation of in-
stitutional and social actors around such a strategy was also imprinted on the reaction to 
protect public sector employment from centrally imposed cuts. In contrast, in MMEs, the 
state is more frequently called on to regulate and correct coordination failures. In Spain, a 
more hierarchical logic of interaction can be said to exist, and social and economic adjust-
ments are often state-driven (Schmidt, 2012). In Parla, acceptance of the need for the cen-
tral state to ‘step in’ and demands for forms of compensation can both be interpreted as re-
flecting this logic and its historical exercise. 
The characteristics of trade union actors in Spain are generally similar to those ex-
pected within MMEs. Unions have significant political influence but tend to compete for 
membership, suffer from low workplace density (Molina & Rhodes, 2007) and focus on 
lobbying the state for protection and compensation (Hassel, 2014). In both our cases, sup-
portive relations existed between the major unions and the ruling political party. In Parla, 
the unions nevertheless remained relatively subjugated to the gate-keeping role of the cen-
tral government and to its power over domestic actors (Molina & Rhodes, 2007). However, 
as simultaneously being regionalist-nationalist and worker organisations, the unions in Bil-
bao appear more capable of benefiting from integration in historically and culturally rooted 
cooperative arrangements. The alignment of institutional actors in the Basque Country re-
flected the tension between these unions’ need to maintain some distance from government 
institutions in order to further its members’ interests while remaining constructive partici-
pants in collective strategies. 
In conclusion, we would concur with Hancké, Rhodes and Thatcher (2007) that there is 
scope to go beyond the ideal types of political economy described in the VoC literature, to 
develop more detailed understanding of the capacities for, and the modes of, coordination 
that shape actors’ behaviour and how such coordination contributes to generating particular 
outcomes. As our study has shown, the interplay of institutions, interests and ideas that 
shape the political economy are not necessarily entirely homogeneous within a national re-
ality. One of the limitations of the VoC approach has been its capacity to explain the dy-
namics of change. Our evidence points to the idea that where national institutions are more 
strongly decentralised, politically transformations may begin to emerge at the sub-national 
level. In the case of the Basque Country, a clearly articulated rationale, set of plans, and a 
level of collective actor support exists for a model of restructuring that is distinctive in 
some respects to the Spanish model (Royo, 2009). 
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A relatively high degree of coordination and alignment among actors was evident in 
our case study of public sector industrial relations in Bilbao, which was not evident in our 
comparative case. We are confident that our case is an accurate reflection of this broader 
political economy in the Basque Country. However, a limitation of our study is the extent to 
which a single case is able to ‘stand-in’ as a valid comparator for the national political 
economy. Due to this, we are more cautious in attributing the outcomes observed in Parla to 
existing political economic arrangements. Idiosyncratic or localised factors may also have 
played an important role. For this reason, further research and more detailed case studies 
will be required before our interpretations and explanations can be confirmed. 
References 
Ayuntamiento de Parla (2014). Anuario Estadístico 2013. Retrieved from  
http://www.ayuntamientoparla.es/ficheros/anuario-estadistico-2013 
Bach, S. & Bordogna, L. (2016). Public Service Management and Employment Relations in Europe: 
Emerging from the Crisis. London: Routledge. 
Bassols Coma, M. (2014). La racionalización de la Administración local en el marco de la sostenibili-
dad financiera: panorama general. Cuadernos de Derecho Local, 34, 21‒48. 
Cerdá Aldeguer, B. (2014). Autonomía Local, equilibrio presupuestario y sostenibilidad financiera. 
Tendencias y perspectivas contemporáneas en las relaciones de tutela financiera y control presu-
puestario local en España (2008-2014). Cuadernos de Gobierno y Administración Pública, 1 (2), 
181‒218. doi: 10.5209/rev_cgap.2014.v1.n2.47541 
Cinco Días (2014). Deuda viva de los ayuntamientos.  
Elola, A., Valdaliso, J. M., López, S. M. & Aranguren, M. J. (2012). Cluster life cycles, path depend-
ency and regional economic development: Insights from a meta-study on Basque clusters. Euro-
pean Planning Studies, 20 (2), 257‒279. doi: 10.1080/09654313.2012.650902 
Fernández Leiceaga, X., Lago Peñas, S. & Vaquero, A. (2016). Spanish fiscal federalism at the cross-
road: A survey. Vigo: Universidade de Vigo. 
Flyvbjerg, B. (2001). Making social science matter: Why social inquiry fails and how it can succeed 
again. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi: 10.1017/CBO9780511810503 
García, E. R. & Fatou, B. L. (2015). Reforma local, servicios sociales y perspectiva de género. Inves-
tigaciones Feministas, 5, 129‒156. doi: 10.5209/rev_infe.2014.v5.47989 
Rodriguez-Ferrand, G. (2011). Spain: Proposed Constitutional Amendment to Include Debt Ceiling 
Provision. Global Legal Monitor. Retrieved from http://bit.ly/2n3GxRt 
Goicoechea Bilbao, I. & López Herrera, C. (2014). Overview of local entities debt: Evolution and ex-
pectations. Spanish Economic and Financial Outlook, 3 (4), 63‒70. 
Hall, P. A. (2014). Varieties of capitalism and the Euro crisis. West European Politics, 37 (6), 1223‒
1243. doi: 10.1080/01402382.2014.929352 
Hall, P. A. & Soskice, D. (2001). Varieties of Capitalism. The Institutional Foundations of Compara-
tive Advantage. Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi: 10.1093/0199247757.001.0001 
Hancké, B., Rhodes, M. & Thatcher, M. (2007). Beyond varieties of capitalism: Conflict, contradic-
tions, and complementarities in the European economy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
doi: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199206483.001.0001 
Hassel, A. (2014). Adjustments in the Eurozone: Varieties of capitalism and the crisis in Southern Eu-
rope. LEQS Paper, 76. doi: 10.2139/ssrn.2436454 
ILO (2014). 371st Report of the Committee on Freedom of Association. Case No. 2947. Geneva: In-
ternational Labour Organization. Retrieved from http://bit.ly/2Dflbqn 
362 Irene Ramos-Vielba, Richard Wolley 
Instituto Nacional de Estadística. (2016). Cifras oficiales de población resultantes de la revisión del 
Padrón municipal a 1 de enero. Retrieved from  
http://www.ine.es/dynt3/inebase/es/index.html?padre=517&dh=1 
Köhler, H.-D. & Calleja Jiménez, J. P. (2013). Trade Unions in Spain. Organisation, Environment, 
Challenges. Berlin: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. 
León, S. (2009). ¿Por qué el sistema de financiación autonómica es inestable? Revista Española de 
Investigaciones Sociológicas, 128, 57‒87. 
Mellado Ruiz, L. (2015). La situación del personal al servicio de la Administración Local. Revista de 
Estudios de la Administración Local y Autonómica, (Extra). doi: 10.24965/reala.v0iExtra.10223 
Miguélez, F., Alós, R., Carrasquer, P., Lope, A., Molina, Ó., Pastor, A., Recio, A., Rodríguez-Soler, 
J., Verd, J. M. & Godino, A. (2015). Diagnóstico socio-económico sobre las políticas de empleo 
en España, 2012‒2014. Barcelona: QUIT. 
Molina, O. (2016). Rationalization without Modernization. Public Service Employment Relations un-
der Austerity. In S. Bach & L. Bordogna (Eds.), Public Service Management and Employment 
Relations in Europe. Emerging from the crisis (pp. 57‒83). London: Routledge. 
Molina, O. & Miguélez, F. (2013). From negotiation to imposition: Social dialogue in austerity times 
in Spain. Geneva: International Labour Organization. 
Molina, O. & Rhodes, M. (2007). The political economy of adjustment in mixed market economies: 
A study of Spain and Italy. In B. Hancké, M. Rhodes & M. Thatcher (Eds.), Beyond Varieties of 
Capitalism: Conflict, contradictions and complementarities in the European economy (pp. 223‒
252). Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199206483.003.0008 
Montesinos, A., Pérez, J. J. & Ramos, R. (2014). El empleo de las Administraciones Públicas en Es-
paña: caracterización y evolución durante la crisis. Madrid: Banco de España. 
Muñoz de Bustillo, R. & Antón, J. I. (2013). Those were the days, my friend: The public sector and 
the economic crisis in Spain. In D. Vaughan-Whitehead (Ed.), Public sector shock: The impact of 
policy retrenchment in Europe (pp. 511‒542). Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing; Ge-
neva: International Labour Office. 
Royo, S. (2007). Varieties of capitalism in Spain: Business and the politics of coordination. European 
Journal of Industrial Relations, 13 (1), 47‒65. doi: 10.1177/0959680107073967 
Royo, S. (2008). Varieties of capitalism in Spain. Remaking the Spanish economy for the new centu-
ry. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Royo, S. (2009). The Politics of Adjustment and Coordination at the Regional Level: The Basque 
Country. CES Working Papers Series, 171. doi: 10.1215/10474552-2009-004 
Royo, S. (2013). A ship in trouble. The Spanish banking system in the midst of the global financial 
system crisis: The limits of regulation. In I. Hardie & D. Howarth (Eds.), Market-Based Banking, 
Varieties of Financial Capitalism and the Financial Crisis. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Ruano, J. M. & Álvarez, J. M. R. (2016). Local structure and municipal associations in Spain: Facts, 
trends and problems. In U. Sadioglu & K. Dede (Eds.), Comparative Studies and Regionally-Focused 
Cases Examining Local Governments (pp. 71‒90). Hershey: Information Science Reference. 
Schmidt, V. A. (2012). What happened to the state-influenced market economies (SMEs)? France, It-
aly, and Spain confront the crisis as the good, the bad, and the ugly. In W. Grant & G. K. Wilson 
(Eds.), The Consequences of the Global Financial Crisis (pp. 156‒186). Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press. 
Téllez, M. D., Hernández de Cos, P., Hurtado, S. & Pérez, J. J. (2015). Los mecanismos extraordinarios 
de pago a proveedores de las Administraciones Públicas en España. Madrid: Banco de España. 
Wollmann, H. & Iglesias, Á. (2011). Transformación y cambio del gobierno local en Europa: un estu-
dio comparativo. Barataria. Revista Castellano-Manchega de Ciencias Sociales (12), 81‒100. 
Yin, R. (2003). Case study research: Design and methods. London: Sage. 
